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This paper shows that altruism may be beneﬁcial in bargaining
when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with
random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material
payoﬀ if players are suﬃciently patient. However, this advantage is
eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly
patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoﬀs.
Keywords: altruism, spite, bargaining, competition, coalition forma-
tion.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Game theory usually assumes that players care only about their own ma-
terial payoﬀ. However, experiments suggest that many people care about
others’ material payoﬀs (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). The simplest
possibilities are altruism - utility increases with other people’s material pay-
oﬀs - and spite - utility decreases with other people’s material payoﬀs. This
paper studies the consequences of allowing for limited altruism or spite in
multilateral bargaining games with complete information.
It is well known that players can beneﬁt from being spiteful in bilateral
bargaining games: a spiteful player is committed to rejecting oﬀers that
would be acceptable to a selﬁsh player, and, if this is anticipated by the
1other player, gets a higher payoﬀ as a result. However, the situation is
more complicated when players can choose bargaining partners: a spiteful
player may get a better deal out of bargaining, but may not get any bar-
gaining partners in the ﬁrst place. On the other hand, even a spiteful player
may lower his demands in view of competition.1 It is then unclear whether
spiteful players do better than selﬁsh players in terms of material payoﬀs.
In this paper I address the question of what preferences are the most
successful in terms of material payoﬀs when there are three players but only
two of them need to cooperate. In a model with irrevocable choice of partner
(players ﬁrst chose a partner to bargain with and then negotiate on payoﬀ
division) neither altruism nor spite are unambiguously advantageous: the
player with intermediate preferences has an advantage. On the other hand,
if players can keep their options open until a payoﬀ division is agreed upon,
the most altruistic player has an advantage in terms of material payoﬀsw h e n
players are suﬃciently patient. However, that advantage is eroded as the
discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and
spite become irrelevant for material payoﬀs.
2 General assumptions
T h e r ea r et h r e ep l a y e r s ,N = {1,2,3}. If two players cooperate, they can
obtain one unit of money. All players are risk neutral and share a discount
factor δ ≤ 1, but they may diﬀer in their attitudes towards other players’




n−1 ,w h e r e−1 < αi < 1 for all i.S e l ﬁsh players have αi = 0, altruistic
players have αi > 0 and spiteful players have αi < 0. Notice the following
consequences of this assumptions:
• The functional form follows Bester and G¨ uth (1998) and Possajennikov
(2000) and allows for altruism and spite, but not for inequality aver-
sion. Unlike in the models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
1Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) point out that competition
may make players behave as if they were selﬁsh even if they are not. They give as an
example the ultimatum game with proposer or responder competition.
2Ockenfels (2000), players are not concerned about inequality as such:
the marginal rate of substitution between own and others’ payoﬀsi sa
constant.2
• As in Bester and G¨ uth (1998), players care more about their own
material payoﬀs than about other players’. If the total material payoﬀ
is X,p l a y e ri’s utility function can be rewritten as ui(.)=( 1−βi)xi+
βiX,w h e r eβi = αi
n−1, −1 < βi < 1. Thus, utility is a weighted
average of own payoﬀ and total payoﬀ.I f X is a constant, utility is
maximized when i gets the whole cake, and thus players’ altruism or
spite is limited.
• Each player is equally altruistic or spiteful towards all other players.
• Preferences only depend on outcomes, and not on things such as past
oﬀers and counteroﬀers.
• Players do not care directly about other players’ preferences (unlike in
Levine (1998)).
• The assumption −1 < αi guarantees that it is never a Pareto im-
provement to throw money away: if an additional ² of money becomes
available and players divide it equally they will all be better-oﬀ.
Assuming that preferences are complete information, what preferences
will be more successful in terms of material payoﬀs?
3 A benchmark: the two-player case
In two-player bargaining, a player’s payoﬀ is higher the more spiteful he is
and the more altruistic the other player is. Assuming that no player can
receive a negative share of the money, there are corner solutions in which the
most altruistic player receives 0. These results are supported by the Nash
(1950) bargaining solution, the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model with
alternating oﬀers and Binmore’s (1987b) variant with random proposers.
2For a model of multiplayer bargaining with inequity aversion see Montero (2005).
33.1 The Nash bargaining solution
The following lemma shows that a player’s material payoﬀ (weakly) increases
as he becomes more spiteful or the other player becomes more altruistic.
Lemma 1 Suppose no player receives any money in case of disagreement,
and let x be the money received by player 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.Then
a) If none of the players is much more altruistic than the other (αi ≤
1






2(1 − α1)(1 − α2)
.
This is decreasing in α1 and increasing in α2.
b) If one of the players is much more altruistic than the other, the Nash
bargaining solution is x∗ =0( α1 > 1




In the Rubinstein bargaining model, the two players alternate making of-
fers until an agreement is reached. Every time an oﬀer is rejected, a period
elapses. For δ < 1, Rubinstein (1982) shows that the subgame perfect equi-
librium of this game is unique and stationary (strategies do not depend on
past play). Binmore (1987a) shows that this subgame perfect equilibrium
converges to the Nash bargaining solution as δ tends to 1. One of Rubin-
stein’s assumptions on preferences is that for any given share of the pie x,
all players prefer to have x now rather than later. This assumption allows
for altruistic players but excludes spiteful ones. However, Rubinstein’s and
Binmore’s results hold in this case as well.
Lemma 2 There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein
game. The equilibrium payoﬀs converge to the Nash bargaining solution as
δ tends to 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The same result holds for the random proposers variant of the Rubin-
stein’s game introduced by Binmore (1987b).
44 A model with irrevocable choice of partner
Suppose there are three players potentially diﬀering in αi, and any two of
them can divide one dollar. The players play the following two-stage game:
• Stage 1: Irrevocable choice of partner. A pair of players emerges from
this stage, and the third player no longer plays a role.
• Stage 2: Once a pair is formed, the players play the Rubinstein game
(or the game with random proposers) described above. If no agreement
is reached, all players receive zero.
Clearly, each player would prefer to form a pair with the most altruistic
of the other two, and the coalition of the two most altruistic players is likely
to emerge. In terms of material payoﬀs, the most spiteful player gets nothing
and the intermediate player does best.
Example 1 Consider α1 = −1
5, α2 =0 , α3 = 1
4 and δ close to 1.
Coalition\Payoﬀs 123
{1,2} 0.58 0.42 −
{1,3} 0.75∗ − 0.25
{2,3} − 0.67∗ 0.33∗
The numbers in the matrix are material payoﬀs, not utilities. However,
given our assumptions every player wants as large a material payoﬀ as pos-
sible. Both players 2 and 3 prefer coalition {2,3} to form. Player 2 gets the
best deal while player 1, who is the toughest, gets nothing.3
Conclusion 1 In the model with irrevocable choice of partner, neither altru-
ism nor spite is unambiguously beneﬁcial. It is the player with intermediate
preferences who does best in material terms.
3Since the third player is no longer in the game, the calculations assume ui = xi+αixj
rather than ui = xi + αi
xj+xk
2 . This makes no diﬀerence to the players’ preferences over
bargaining partners.
5This result echoes Binmore’s (1985) result on bargaining with diﬀerent
discount factors: the player who can get a better deal out of bilateral bar-
gaining is excluded when there is a choice of bargaining partners.4
5 A competitive model with choice of partner
In the model with irrevocable choice of partner, the most spiteful player
suﬀers from a sort of hold-up problem. Since he gets nothing out of the
situation he would be willing to moderate his demands in order to get into a
coalition. However, once he is alone with the other player he has no incentive
to do so, thus he is always excluded from the coalition that forms.
Suppose instead that this problem is not present. Players can agree on
ap a y o ﬀ division at the same time they form a coalition, and there is eﬀec-
tive competition between the players. A way of modelling the competition
between players is to consider bargaining games with random proposers (in-
troduced by Binmore, 1987b and extended by Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
and Okada (1996)).
5.1 Preliminaries
In a game with random proposers, each of the three players is selected to be
proposer with probability 1
3. The proposer i chooses a responder j and oﬀers
him a division of the monetary payoﬀ.P l a y e rj then accepts or rejects. If
j rejects, a period elapses and a new proposer is selected - again each of
the players with probability 1
3 -. We focus of stationary subgame perfect
equilibria (SSPE). These are subgame perfect equilibria in which players’
strategies do not condition on elements of history other than the current
proposal.
Given a strategy combination, we will use the following notation:
yi for the expected material payoﬀ for player i.
4In Binmore’s ”telephone bargaining” model, later generalized by Chatterjee et al.
(1993), players are not irrevocably committed to a bargaining partner. However, compet-
itive pressures in the model are very weak: for example, in a market with one seller and
n ≥ 1 identical buyers, the equilibrium price is independent of n.
6ri for the probability that i receives an oﬀer.
λij for the probability that i makes a proposal to j, conditional on i
being selected to be proposer.
xi for the oﬀer that makes player i indiﬀerent between accepting it or
rejecting it (given that the proposer gets 1 − xi).
Because each player would like to keep as much of the dollar as possible,
xi will play an important role in the analysis. In equilibrium the proposer
will choose the player with the lowest xi and oﬀer him exactly xi.A p a r -
ticular class of equilibria that will be important has the property that each
player is indiﬀerent between proposing to any of the other two players. Then
xi = x for all i. We will refer to this type of equilibria as mixed-strategy
SSPE because players typically randomize between partners.
Lemma 3 Let δ ≤ 1. All SSPE of the game are such that a coalition is
formed immediately and the proposer oﬀers a responder i exactly xi.
Proof. Given any SSPE, we can calculate the expected utility player
i would get from rejecting a proposal. Because equilibrium strategies are
stationary, this utility does not depend on what has happened in the game so
far. Because the utility function is linear, the utility of rejecting a proposal






; only the average material payoﬀs matter.
Let i be a player with yi < 1. Consider the situation of player i as pro-







But he can do better by proposing to the player j with the lowest yj and
oﬀering him δyj +
1−δyi−δyj
2 , keeping δyi +
1−δyi−δyj
2 for himself. This pro-
posal will be accepted by j and is strictly preferred by i t oap r o p o s a lt h a t
would be rejected (equal division of the extra payoﬀ e n s u r e st h i se v e ni fi
and/or j are spiteful).
Finally, no player can have yi = 1 because he would receive no proposals,
contradicting yi = 1. Thus, all proposals made in equilibrium are accepted.









; otherwise the proposer would be better-oﬀ by reducing i’s
share.
75.2 Patient players (δ =1 )
With patient players, altruism and spite play no role.
Proposition 1 If δ =1 , the unique SSPE is such that the ﬁrst proposer
forms a coalition with one of the other players and keeps 2
3 of the total payoﬀ,
regardless of (αi)i∈N.
Proof. Because of lemma 3, the players will always agree to divide the
whole payoﬀ.T h u s , m a t e r i a l p a y o ﬀs add up to 1 and the utility function
can be written as ui(.)=( 1− αi
2 )zi + αi
2 ,w h e r ezi is player i’s material
payoﬀ. But then we can take αi
2 from both sides and divide by 1− αi
2 in the
relevant equations, and altruism and spite become irrelevant.
As an illustration, suppose we have an equilibrium and let i be a player
who receives proposals with positive probability and j a player who receives
proposals from player i. In equilibrium xi must be such that i is indiﬀerent




































2 from both sides and dividing by 1 − αi








This is precisely the same equilibrium condition that we would have with
selﬁsh players.
The equilibrium of this game with selﬁsh players is described by Baron
and Ferejohn (1989). They show that in any equilibrium xi = 1
3 for all i,
thus the proposer oﬀers 1
3 to one of the other two players and keeps 2
3 for
himself. Equilibrium strategies are not unique, but they must be such that
each player is equally likely to be in the ﬁnal coalition; for example, each
player can propose to each of the others with probability 1
2.
85.3 Impatient players (δ < 1)
Altruism or spite will play a role because if a proposal is rejected there is a
period in which all players get 0, and diﬀerent players may feel diﬀerently
about this. Altruism in this context is similar to impatience, and would
seem to reduce bargaining power. However, it turns out that if players are
suﬃciently patient the most altruistic player does best.
Proposition 2 If δ is suﬃciently close to 1, there is an SSPE with the
property that the most altruistic player has the highest expected material
payoﬀ.
To prove this result, we show that in a mixed-strategy SSPE the more
altruistic players must do better in material terms. We then go on to con-
struct such an equilibrium.
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player must be indiﬀerent between
proposing to any of the other two. All players make the same proposal: they
oﬀer x to one of the other players, and keep 1 − x for themselves. Because
the responder must be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting, a mixed-
strategy SSPE must be a solution to the following system (where i =1 ,2,3
























(2 − λji − λki)
αi
2
There are three additional equations of the form λij + λik =1 . Thus,
we have six equations and seven unknowns (x and six λij’s). We will show
that for δ suﬃciently close to 1 we can ﬁnd values for the λij’s such that
0 ≤ λij ≤ 1f o ra l li 6= j, and a unique solution for the equilibrium proposal
x, the expected material payoﬀs for each player (yi)i∈N and the probabilities
of receiving proposals for each player (ri)i∈N.
Lemma 4 In a mixed-strategy SSPE, the equilibrium values of x, (yi)i∈N
and (ri)i∈N are uniquely determined given (αi)i∈N and δ.
9Proof. Because players are risk neutral, we can write the indiﬀerence
conditions of the players in terms of (yi)i∈N and x. The equilibrium values






































Given the equilibrium value for x,t h ev a l u ef o rri can be found from the






























Lemma 5 In a mixed-strategy SSPE, the value of yi is increasing in αi and
decreasing in αj.










The intuition for this result is that, in order for a mixed-strategy SSPE
to exist, all players must have the same value of xi, even though they may
have diﬀerent values for αi. Equilibrium strategies should then balance
two sources of bargaining power: the way players react to the possibility
of delay, and how often people receive proposals. Because more altruistic
players suﬀer more from delay they must receive proposals more often.
Thus, altruism is beneﬁcial if players are playing a mixed strategy equi-
librium. However, this eﬀect becomes smaller as players become more pa-
tient, as the following corollary shows.
10Lemma 6 Let αi > αj, and suppose we have a mixed-strategy SSPE. Then
yi − yj is decreasing in δ.
Proof. yi − yj =
2(1−δ)(αi−αj)
δ(2−αi)(2−αj). The derivative of this expression with
respect to δ is −
2(αi−αj)
δ2(2−αi)(2−αj) < 0.
In order for a mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, players must be suf-
ﬁciently patient as the following lemmas show.
Lemma 7 The value of x given by (1) is decreasing in each αi and increas-












,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e
because αi > −1 for all i.
Because x is decreasing in each αi,i ts u ﬃces to ﬁnd a value of δ that
guarantees x ≥ 0w h e na l lαi’s are close to 1. If we replace each αi by 1,
x = 4δ−3
3 ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ef o rδ ≥ 3
4.
It remains to show that we can ﬁnd a collection (λij)i6=j (with λij ∈ [0,1]
and λij + λik =1 )s ot h a te a c hp l a y e ro ﬀering x to one of the others is an
equilibrium. This will be possible provided that δ is suﬃciently close to 1.
Lemma 8 shows that, for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the equilibrium value of
ri is between 0 and 2
3 for any preference proﬁle (αi)i∈N. This is clearly a
necessary condition for the existence of a suitable collection (λij)i6=j.L e m m a
9 shows that it is also suﬃcient.
Lemma 8 The value of ri that solves (3) is between 0 and 2
3 if δ is suﬃ-
ciently close to 1.
Proof. The expression for ri as a function of (αi)i∈N can be found by
solving for ri in (3) and then replacing x by its equilibrium value found
in (1). Because exactly one player is the responder, the solution satisﬁes
P
ri =1 .
It can be shown5 that dri
dαi > 0a n d dri
dαj = −
2(1−δ)(αi(2δ−3)+2δ)
9δx2(2−αi)(2−αj)2 < 0f o r
δ ≥ 3
4. This implies that the condition ri ≥ 0w i l lb em o s td i ﬃcult to
5A proof is available from the author.
11satisfy when αi is close to −1a n dαj and αk are close to 1. Analogously,
the condition ri ≤ 2
3 will be most diﬃcult to satisfy when αi is close to 1
and αj and αk are close to −1.
The value of ri associated to αi = −1a n dαj = αk =1i s8δ2+19δ−24
3δ(8δ−5) ,




16 ≈ 0.913. The value of ri associated
to αi =1a n dαj = αk = −1i s 4δ2−25δ+24
3δ(4δ−1) , which is smaller than 2
3 for
δ ≥ 0.902.
We have shown that the candidate equilibrium values for ri are between
0a n d2
3 provided that δ is large enough. It is also the case that
P
ri =1 .
Lemma 9 Suppose we have a vector (ri)i∈N such that 0 ≤ ri ≤ 2
3 for all i
and
P
i∈N ri =1 . Then there are mixed strategies that implement (ri)i∈N.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose r3 ≥ r2 ≥ r1.
Equilibrium strategies must satisfy the following system of equations
1
3
(λji + λki)=ri,i =1 ,2,3










(2 − λ12 − λ21)=1 − r1 − r2
The three equations are not linearly independent: the ﬁrst two imply
the third. Taking λ31 as a parameter we ﬁnd:
λ12 =3 r2 − 1+λ31
λ21 =3 r1 − λ31
W ew a n tt os e tav a l u ef o rλ31 such that λ12 and λ21 are between 0 and
1. Notice that, because r3 ≥ 1
3, 1
3 ≤ r1 + r2 ≤ 2
3.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s :
a) r2 ≥ 1
3:t h e nλ31 = 0 is suitable.
12b) r2 ≤ 1
3:t h e nλ31 =1− 3r2 is suitable.
Even thought equilibrium strategies are not unique, equilibrium payoﬀs
are. Uniqueness of equilibrium payoﬀs can be shown by considering each
possible type of equilibrium in turn. We have seen that an equilibrium
exists with xi = xj = xk; the other three possibilities are xi >x j = xk, xi =
xj >x k and xi >x j >x k. These other possibilities can be eliminated by
calculating the equilibrium values of (xi)i∈N implied by player’s preferences
(for example, if xi >x j >x k,p l a y e r si and j always propose to k and
player k always proposes to j) and reaching a contradiction (in the case
xi >x j >x k, one would actually ﬁnd xk >x i).
The following example illustrates how the most altruistic player is the
most successful in purely material terms and how this eﬀect is less pro-
nounced when players are more patient.
Example 2 Consider α1 = −1
5, α2 =0 , α3 = 1
4.
δ =0 .65 (x =0 .21)S p i t e f u l S e l ﬁsh Altruistic
Probability of being in coalition 0.39 0.62 0.99
Expected material payoﬀs 0.28 0.32 0.40
δ =0 .85 (x =0 .28)S p i t e f u l S e l ﬁsh Altruistic
Probability of being in coalition 0.60 0.66 0.75
Expected material payoﬀs 0.31 0.33 0.36
If δ is not suﬃciently close to 1, the most altruistic player is not necessar-
ily the one that does best in terms of material payoﬀs, as the next example
illustrates.
Example 3 Consider α1 = −2
3, α2 = −1
2, α3 = 3
4 and δ =0 .8.T h eu n i q u e
SSPE equilibrium is such that players 1 and 2 propose (0.87,0.13) to player
3,a n dp l a y e r3 proposes (0.68,0.32) to either player 1 -w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
0.44 -o rp l a y e r2 -w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y0.56 -. Expected material payoﬀsa r e
(0.34,0.35,0.32),t h u sp l a y e r2 is doing best.
136 Conclusion
In purely material terms, spite is beneﬁcial in two-player situations (or in
general in unanimous bargaining). Intermediate preferences (relative to the
preferences of the other two players) are best in three-player games with irre-
vocable choice of partner. In more competitive environments the most altru-
istic player does best in material terms provided that players are suﬃciently
patient. However, when δ equals 1 altruism and spite become irrelevant.
The results imply that the same characteristics of preferences that are
beneﬁcial in two-player bargaining can be detrimental when there is competi-
tion for bargaining partners. Related results have been found by Harrington
(1990) for risk aversion and Kawamori (2005) for impatience. The driving
force behind this type of results is that, if every player were to receive oﬀers
with the same probability, the ’weakest’ player would have the lowest con-
tinuation value and be the most desirable partner; thus in equilibrium the
weakest types receive proposals more often.
Altruism matters because it aﬀects the players’ attitudes towards dis-
agreement. With discounting, disagreement occurs temporarily and altru-
ism interacts with discounting so that more altruistic players behave like
more impatient players. In the inﬁnite horizon game without discounting,
agreement is guaranteed and altruism and spite become irrelevant.6
An important assumption behind the results is that players are indis-
criminately altruistic or spiteful. If instead we allow for utility functions
of the type ui(x)=xi +
P
j6=i αijxj, altruism may be detrimental. As
an illustration, suppose player 1 is altruistic towards player 2 (that is,
u1(x)=x1 + α1x2 with α1 > 0 )a n dp l a y e r s2a n d3a r es e l ﬁsh. Because
player 1 is altruistic towards player 2, he will prefer to propose to player
2 unless 2 has a signiﬁcantly higher continuation value than 3. Moreover,
player 1 requires a lower payoﬀ in order to accept a proposal if the proposer
6In a ﬁnite-horizon bargaining game without discounting, spite would still play some
role because the most spiteful player never receives a proposal in the last period; altruism
and selﬁshness however would be indistinguishable because both altruistic and selﬁsh
players would accept 0 in the last period. See Norman (2002) for an analysis of the
bargaining procedure with a ﬁnite horizon and selﬁsh players.
14is player 2. In the mixed-strategy SSPE, player 2 has the highest mate-
rial payoﬀ, and 1 and 3 are equally hurt in material terms by 1’s altruism
towards 2.7
In Bester and G¨ uth (1998), if an altruistic player is paired with an ego-
istic one, the egoistic player does better than the altruistic one in material
terms. The possibility of evolutionary stability of altruistic players arises
because the presence of altruistic players increases eﬃciency. Because of
this, an altruistic player may do better against another altruistic player
than a selﬁsh player would do against an altruistic player. In this paper
there is no possibility of eﬃciency gains. Total material payoﬀsa l w a y sa d d
up to 1 provided that players reach an agreement immediately, and even
the most spiteful players manage to do that. There is no possibility for
altruistic preferences to be stable in bilateral situations. Altruistic prefer-
ences however have an advantage when there is competition for bargaining
partners. Altruistic players are more popular in equilibrium, despite the
fact that other types of players have moderated their demands due to the
competitive pressures. If we made the (very arbitrary!) assumption that
players always interact in triads, altruistic preferences would not only be
evolutionarily stable, but could successfully invade a population made by
any other preferences provided that players are suﬃciently patient.
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7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 . Because no player receives any money in case of
disagreement,8 the utility associated with disagreement is 0 regardless of
7Calvert and Dietz (1998) allow for identity-dependent altruism, but require αij = αji.
8If one or both players receive something in case of disagreement, they will come to an
agreement provided that the sum of material payoﬀs in case of disagreement is less than
1. This is because the extra money can be divided equally.
15preferences. The Nash bargaining solution would be the solution to
max (x + α1(1 − x))(1 − x + α2x)
s. t. x ∈ [0,1]
x + α1(1 − x) ≥ 0
1 − x + α2x ≥ 0
The maximization problem takes into account that players will never
agree to throw money away, so player 2’s share equals 1 − x.T h er e q u i r e -
ment x ∈ [0,1] is a feasibility requirement. The other two constraints are
individual rationality constraints: the agreement must guarantee a utility of
0t ob o t hp l a y e r s .
Ignoring the constraints for the moment, the FOC of this maximization
problem is







2(1 − α1)(1 − α2)
.
Since −(1−α1)(1−α2) < 0, the second order condition for a maximum
is always satisﬁed. The solution also satisﬁes individual rationality for both
players, but it is not always between 0 and 1. In some cases (when α1 and
α2 are suﬃciently dissimilar) we will have a corner solution. If α1 ≥ 1
2−α2
we have x =0 ;i fα2 ≥ 1
2−α1 we have x = 1. If both players are selﬁsh or
spiteful, the solution is always interior. Thus, corner solutions are always
individually rational because the player getting 0 must be altruistic.
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 . Let us look for a stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium. Denote player 1’s proposal by (x,1−x) and player 2’s proposal
by (y,1−y). Because each player (however altruistic) will oﬀer the other as
l i t t l ea sp o s s i b l e ,i na ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ne a c hr e s p o n d e ri si n d i ﬀerent between
accepting a proposal and rejecting it, thus:
y + α1(1 − y)=δ (x + α1(1 − x))
1 − x + α2x = δ (1 − y + α2y)
16The solution to this system is x =
1−α1(1+δ(1−α2))
(1−α1)(1−α2)(1+δ) and y =
δ−α1(1+δ−α2)
(1−α1)(1−α2)(1+δ).
In order for these values to be between 0 and 1, we need αi ≤ δ
1+δ−αj for
i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.B o t hx and y converge to 1
2 − α1−α2
2(1−α1)(1−α2) as δ tends to 1.
If α1 ≥ δ
1+δ−α2, there is a corner solution. Player 2 claims the whole
payoﬀ when he proposes; player 1 makes the proposal that makes 2 indif-
ferent. Player 1 prefers to accept nothing in the current period rather than
endure delay. The corresponding equations would be:
1 − x + α2x = δ (indiﬀerence condition for player 2)
α1 ≥ δ [x + α1(1 − x)] (player 1 prefers to accept (0,1))
The solution to the ﬁrst equation is x = 1−δ
1−α2, always positive. In order
for x ≤ 1 we need α2 ≤ δ. In order for player 1 to be willing to accept (0,1)
we need α1 ≥ δ
1+δ−α2. This bound becomes more demanding with δ and at
the limit becomes α1 ≥ 1
2−α2.
If αi > δ for i =1 ,2, we have a corner solution in which 1 proposes
(1,0) and 2 proposes (0,1). Because αi < 1f o ri =1 ,2, this type of corner
solution is not relevant for suﬃciently large values of δ.
Uniqueness of equilibrium can be shown adapting the arguments in Sut-




i) the supremum (inﬁmum) of the utility player i can
get in any subgame perfect equilibrium as the proposer. Because equilibria
c o u l di np r i n c i p l ebei n e ﬃcient and player 1’s utility depends on both players’
share, there isn’t a unique payoﬀ division associated to these utility levels.
However, we can ﬁnd the share Mi ∈ [0,1] such that player i’s utility when
he gets Mi and j gets 1 − Mi equals U∗
i (we can deﬁne mi analogously).9
Since in order to keep player 1 indiﬀerent we need to give player 2 more
than half of the (possible) extra payoﬀ,p l a y e r2w e a k l yp r e f e r s( M1,1−M1)
9The existence of Mi ≥ 0i sg u a r a n t e e de v e ni fi is altruistic: if the equilibrium is not
eﬃcient we need to reduce player i’ ss h a r et om a k eh i mi n d i ﬀerent, but i cannot prefer to
let j get the whole payoﬀ rather than play the equilibrium, since i can always oﬀer the
whole payoﬀ to j and j would accept.
17to the actual equilibrium at the subgame in which player 1 proposes and
get his supremum payoﬀ. Moreover, player 2’s utility associated to the
supremum must be at least δu∗
2,t h a ti s ,δu2(1 − m2,m 2). Thus
u2(M1,1 − M1) ≥ δu2(1 − m2,m 2). (4)
On the other hand, a proposal of player 1 never needs to give player 2 a
utility higher than δu2(1−M2,M 2). Nevertheless, there is one case in which
1 prefers to give 2 a higher utility: if 2 prefers to accept (1,0) rather than
wait one period to obtain u2(1 − M2,M 2). Thus10
u2(m1,1 − m1) ≤ max[u2(1,0),δu2(1 − M2,M 2)]. (5)
There are two analogous equations for player 1.
u1(1 − M2,M 2) ≥ δu1(m1,1 − m1). (6)
u1(1 − m2,m 2) ≤ max[u1(0,1),δ (u1(M1,1 − M1))]. (7)
There are four possible cases, depending on what the maximum is on the
right-hand side of expressions (5) and (7). We examine each case in turn.
1. If max[u2(1,0),δu2(1 − M2,M 2)] = δu2(1 − M2,M 2)a n d
max[u1(0,1),δ (u1(M1,1 − M1))] = δu1(M1,1 − M1), we can replace
ui(.) by its value in the four equations above, and manipulate then to
show that M1 = m1 and M2 = m2.
Equation (4) can be written as 1−M1+α2M1 ≥ δ (m2 + α2(1 − m2)).
Note that since α2 < 1, the right-hand side is increasing in m2.
Equation (7) becomes 1−m2 +α1m2 ≤ δ(M1 +α1(1−M1)), or, since
α1 < 1, m2 ≥
1−δ(M1+α1(1−M1))
1−α1 . Combining these two expressions
leads to
M1 ≤
1 − α1(1 + δ(1 − α2))
(1 − α1)(1 − α2)(1 + δ)
.
10If the actual equilibrium proposal is not eﬃcient, it cannot be the case that
u2(m1,1 − m1) > δu2(1 − M2,M 2) ,b e c a u s et h e np l a y e r1c o u l dh a v em a d eaP a r e t o
improving proposal that player 2 would accept and we would not have an equilibrium.
18Analogously, from (5) and (6) we obtain
m1 ≥
1 − α1(1 + δ(1 − α2))
(1 − α1)(1 − α2)(1 + δ)
.
Thus, player 1 obtains the same payoﬀ as a proposer in any SPE of
this type.
Analogously, we can show that M2 = m2 =
1−α2(1+δ(1−α1))
(1−α1)(1−α2)(1+δ).
In order for the equilibrium payoﬀs we have calculated to be between
0 and 1, we need αi ≤ δ
1+δ−αj for i, j =1 ,2.
2. If max[u2(1,0),δu2(1 − M2,M 2)] = δu2(1 − M2,M 2)a n d
max[u1(0,1),δ (u1(M1,1 − M1))] = u1(0,1), player 2 proposes (0,1)
in any SPE. Thus, M2 = m2 = 1. Player 1’s proposal is found from






In order for this value to be smaller than 1, we need α2 ≤ δ.I no r d e r
for player 1 to prefer (0,1) now rather than (m1,1 − m1) in the next
period, we need α1 ≥ δ
1+δ−α2.
3. Analogously, if max[u2(1,0),δu2(1 − M2,M 2)] = u2(1,0) and
max[u1(0,1),δ (u1(M1,1 − M1))] = δ (u1(M1,1 − M1)), player 1 pro-
poses (1,0) and player 2 proposes (1 − m2,m 2)w h e r em2 = 1−δ
1−α2 in
any SPE. This case requires α1 ≤ δ and α2 ≥ δ
1+δ−α1.
4. Finally, if max[u2(1,0),δu2(1 − M2,M 2)] = u2(1,0) and
max[u1(0,1),δ (u1(M1,1 − M1))] = u1(0,1), player 1 proposes (1,0)
and player 2 proposes (0,1) in any SPE of this type. This case re-
quires α1 ≥ δ and α2 ≥ δ.
Since each possible combination (α1,α2) corresponds to only one type
of equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs are unique.
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